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“The crisis taught us that we must be vigilant in safeguarding the resilience of our 
financial system at times when vulnerabilities are building up. The slower growth 
momentum we are seeing increases the risk of tail events… Bank capital plays a crucial 
role in absorbing these tail risks: it provides solvency insurance and makes it more likely 
that banks will be able to continue to provide credit during a downturn.” Luis de 
Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, May 2019. 
While the impact of policy uncertainty on economic outcomes and firms’ plans has become an 
extensively researched area, the impact of policy uncertainty on the future capital shortfall 
remains a relatively unexplored field of research. Recently, concerns have been growing 
regarding the capital shortfall of financial institutions, as the implementation of the Basel III 
rules necessitates that financial institutions raise more capital in order to meet the regulatory 
standards. For example, in March 2019, the Bundesbank announced that “The total capital 
shortfall assuming the full implementation of the final Basel III standards increased slightly 
from €12.2 billion to €15.5 billion compared with the previous survey based on 
31 December 2017 data,”1 while the Financial Times reported that “Listed Chinese banks will 
need to raise about $260bn in fresh capital over the next three years as regulations force 
shadow-bank loans back on to balance sheets and global rules on systemically important 
groups impose extra requirements on the largest lenders.”2  Furthermore, the concept of capital 
shortage is very important in today’s global business environment because corporations now 
operate in an interconnected and globalized environment, and hence, the distress of one firm 






would affect other firms through networks of interdependencies. Influential studies in the area 
show that various channels such as cross-holdings of shares, and other cross-border interbank 
connections aid the contagion of shocks to governments, central and other kinds of banks and 
financial institutions (see among others,  Elliott, Golub and Jackson, 2014 and Acemoglu, 
Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2012).  
There exists a broad consensus that economic policy uncertainty affects the economic 
environment in which firms and households operate. Empirical research shows that economic 
policy uncertainty negatively affects the real economy along with the financial markets (e.g., 
Pástor and Veronesi, 2012; Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016; Kelly, Pástor, and Veronesi, 2016). 
From a firm’s perspective, the effects of elevated economic policy uncertainty range from the 
postponement and decrease of corporate investments (Bernanke, 1983; Gulen and Ion, 2016; 
Julio and Yook, 2016) to adverse effects in terms of corporate spreads and lending availability 
(Waisman, Ye, and Zhu, 2015; Çolak, Durnev, and Qian, 2017; Lee, Lee, Zeng, and Hsu, 2017; 
Nguyen and Phan, 2017). Further, a number of studies show that an increase in bank failures 
and delays in firms’ leverage adjustments is related to the political component of economic 
policy uncertainty (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Liu and Ngo, 2014; Çolak, Gungoraydinoglu, and 
Öztekin, 2018). 
The global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007-2008 prompted unprecedented capital 
injections into financial institutions worldwide, which resulted in significant fiscal costs. There 
is a general consensus that if appropriate financial regulation and supervision of the financial 
markets and financial institutions had been imposed prior to or during the GFC, then the degree 
of uncertainty and the economic impact would have been less severe. Therefore, it is essential 
to investigate whether unclear and delayed policy decisions by central banks, regulators, and 
governments are related to future capital shortages (or shortfalls) on the part of economic 
agents in the event of a new crisis.  
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In this paper, we shed light on the relationship between policy-related uncertainty and 
the expected capital needs of financial firms in the event of a future crisis. Our research 
objectives spring from the works by Gulen and Ion (2016) and Nguyen and Phan (2017), who 
document a negative relation between policy uncertainty and US firm-level investments and 
mergers and acquisitions, respectively. However, the availability of capital is a prerequisite for 
these corporate actions. If policy uncertainty contributes to an increase in the capital shortage, 
firms will postpone or revoke their investments and acquisitions. In this study, we provide 
further evidence about the economic channel that links policy uncertainty and corporate 
actions. As we show, our study further extends the work of Gungoraydinoglu, Çolak, and 
Öztekin (2017) by providing empirical evidence of the relationship between a firm’s capital 
availability and policy uncertainty. They identify the financial intermediation channel between 
a firm’s investment, leverage, and cash management policies and policy uncertainty, and they 
find that at uncertain times the cost burden of a firm will be higher. We take a step back, and 
by establishing a link between a firm’s available capital and increasing policy uncertainty, we 
argue that during such times the available capital is lower than expected.  
We may summarize our main contribution and the novelty of our approach as follows: 
First, we provide international empirical evidence on the relation between economic policy 
uncertainty and a firm’s capital shortfall in the event of a new financial crisis. While most of 
the related literature regarding policy uncertainty focuses on only the US, we endeavor to 
provide a global analysis by investigating 1,162 firms in five regions. Second, we seek to 
expand the research focus by investigating the importance of policy uncertainty in five financial 
sectors, whereas the majority of the prior literature focuses on either banks or non-financial 
firms. This represents an important contribution because non-bank financial firms that operate 
in multiple countries are less regulated, although they do contribute to the systemic risk (e.g., 
the US government rescued AIG with a $182 billion bailout). Third, by decomposing the 
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capital shortfall, we aim to show that economic policy uncertainty exerts a greater effect on the 
systemic component than on the leverage component, which points to pronounced effects 
during economic downturns due to the interconnectedness of financial firms. Fourth, we aim 
to establish the economic mechanism through which global economic policy uncertainty affects 
the capital shortfall. Finally, we argue that policy uncertainty can exert a significant positive 
long-term impact on the capital shortfall of up to two years in duration in the case of a new 
crisis. 
We employ an international dataset and consider all types of financial firms. In this way, 
we are able to explore which types of financial firms and which regions are more affected in 
the case of a new financial crisis and under which circumstances the effect will be minimal. To 
the best of our knowledge, this represents the first attempt to examine the effect of global policy 
uncertainty on financial firms’ capital shortfall. To quantify this relationship, we employ 
Davis’s (2016) global economic policy uncertainty (GEPU) index as a measure of policy 
uncertainty globally and the systemic risk (SRISK) indicator proposed by Acharya, Engle, and 
Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2016) as a measure of capital shortfall. The 
GEPU index is a gross domestic product (GDP)-weighted average of Baker, Bloom, and 
Davis’s (2016) national news-based indices, which capture uncertainty due to economic policy 
decisions, while the SRISK indicator is a market-data-based risk measure, which calculates the 
expected capital shortfall conditional on a severe market downturn and is an increasing function 
of systemic risk and leverage.  
We briefly summarize our key findings. We confirm a positive and significant (both 
statistically and economically) relation between the GEPU index and the SRISK indicator, and 
this relation holds for all financial sectors and geographical regions. We also quantify the rise 
in the capital shortfall if governments and policymakers are not decisive and swift to act during 
a crisis period. Our findings indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in the GEPU index 
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is associated with a $205 billion increase in the capital shortage at the end of 2016 in the case 
of a systemic event. To put these amounts into perspective, the Capital Purchase Program used 
$205 billion from the funds of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which amounted to $700 
billion. Furthermore, a 100% increase in policy uncertainty is related to a 17.6% increase, on 
average, in the capital shortage, which corresponds to $528 billion in additional capital at the 
end of 2016. This is a significant finding, as the GEPU index increased by 119% after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and by 92% twice, first during the GFC of 2008 and then following the US 
presidential elections in 2016.  
It is worth mentioning that our results withstand a battery of alternative specifications, 
subsample analyses, and robustness tests. First, we take into account the potential omitted 
variable bias by including the relevant sets of control variables for the market and 
macroeconomic conditions as well as for the different sources of uncertainty. Second, we 
employ an instrumental variable analysis, placebo tests, and exogenous shocks to identify the 
exogenous variation in economic policy uncertainty and to mitigate concerns about 
endogeneity and possible reverse causality. Finally, we analyze the effect of global economic 
policy uncertainty on the regional capital shortfall, as per types of financial firms, market 
threshold declines, and capital shortfall severance. We also consider well-capitalized firms and 
alternative regression specifications.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
empirical literature, while Section 3 describes the dataset and the empirical methodology we 
employ to investigate the relationship between policy uncertainty and the capital shortfall. 
Section 4 provides empirical evidence in support of the view that policy uncertainty matters, 
while Section 5 establishes the channel through which economic policy uncertainty affects the 
capital shortfall. In Section 6, we present the tests used to mitigate endogeneity concerns, and 
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in Section 7, we present the sensitivity analyses and robustness tests. Finally, Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Economic policy uncertainty 
Uncertainty, whether political or impact, affects the environment in which firms and 
households operate.3 A well-developed strand of the literature shows that policy uncertainty, 
which arises not only from the uncertainty stemming from elections and political instability, 
but also from the actions of policymakers, can have long-lasting effects on the stock and bond 
markets as well as on the real economy. Pástor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) develop a theoretical 
model that explains the relation between policy uncertainty and stock prices, and they show 
that changes in government policy lead to substantial price declines. Naturally, the option 
markets and bond markets are affected as the price, tail, variance risk (Kelly, Pástor, and 
Veronesi, 2016), and corporate spreads all increase (Waisman, Ye, and Zhu, 2015). Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2012, 2016) and Azzimonti (2018) show that periods of high uncertainty 
(policy or political) adversely impact gross investment, industrial production, employment, and 
therefore, the real economy.  
The main mechanism, as identified in the literature, through which uncertainty affects 
the real economy is via corporate decisions such as investments, dividend policies, leverage 
adjustments, and mergers and acquisitions. In his research on cyclical investment fluctuations, 
Bernanke (1983) shows that in periods of high uncertainty, companies postpone investments, 
                                                          
3 Pástor and Veronesi (2012) define two types of policy uncertainties that affect stock prices. The first is political 
uncertainty, and it arises because firms and households do not know whether a government will continue to 
implement current policies in the future (e.g., tax policy). The second one is impact uncertainty, which is related 
to the impact that the new policies will have on the economy.  
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especially if the project is irreversible, or if high costs will arise from firing workers or 
canceling the project, while they implement investments following the end of the uncertainty 
period.4 More recently, Stokey (2016) develops a model of tax policy and business fixed 
investments, and she shows that firms adopt a wait-and-see policy when the uncertainty of the 
implemented tax reforms is high, while they implement their projects when the uncertainty is 
resolved. Gulen and Ion (2016) provide evidence in support of the notion that policy 
uncertainty can serve to depress corporate investment by inducing precautionary delays due to 
the irreversibility of investments. The authors attribute a 10% decrease in capital investments 
during the recent GFC to the increase in policy uncertainty. The effect on dividend policies is 
examined by Buchanan, Xuying Cao, Liljeblom, and Weihrich (2017), who show that before 
an expected tax increase, dividend policies are revised, which leads to increased dividend 
amounts in the year prior to the tax increase. Çolak, Gungoraydinoglu, and Öztekin (2018) find 
that the leverage adjustment of firms’ delays when uncertainty is high, as well as the time 
needed to minimize the gap between firms’ actual and optimal capital structures, double during 
periods of elevated uncertainty. Finally, policy uncertainty affects mergers and acquisitions 
negatively, in addition to increasing the time required to complete them (Nguyen and Phan, 
2017; Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion, 2018).5 
                                                          
4 Nowadays, politicians recognize the effect of policy uncertainty on firms’ investments. Chancellor Philip 
Hammond, while analyzing the negotiations between the EU and the UK regarding their post-Brexit relation, said 
that “It is absolutely clear [to] businesses where they have discretion over investment, where they can hold off, 
are doing so - you can understand why … They are waiting for more clarity about what the future relationship 
with Europe will look like” (http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40623473). 
5 Isolating the political component of policy uncertainty, Julio and Yook (2012, 2016) find that during election 
years, there is a 4.8% decrease in investments and a significant drop in foreign direct investments. The decrease 
is more pronounced when the outcome of the election is unpredictable and the country’s institutional level is low. 
Similarly, gubernatorial elections and the political turnover affect initial public offering (IPO) activity (Çolak, 
Durnev, and Qian, 2017) and corporate investments (An, Chen, Luo, and Zhang, 2016), respectively. Financial 
intermediation costs also contribute to the effect of political uncertainty on corporate activities. Gungoraydinoglu, 
Çolak, and Öztekin (2017) simultaneously analyze financing, investment, and cash policies, and they report a 
decrease in leverage levels and corporate security offerings when firms are exposed to policy uncertainty. Their 




Bank credit growth is another important channel through which policy uncertainty affects 
the real economy, corporate firms, and financial institutions. Bordo, Duca, and Koch (2016) 
show that high levels of policy uncertainty slowed banks’ loan growth and decreased the annual 
loan growth by an average of 2.5% from 2007 to 2013. This effect is more pronounced for 
larger, lower capitalized, and less liquid banks. Similarly, Lee, Lee, Zeng, and Hsu (2017) 
focus on the leverage decisions of financial institutions, and they find that uncertainty has a 
negative short-term effect on the leverage decisions of financial institutions, although it has a 
positive long-term effect. Tightening credit conditions often impact firms’ cost of capital, and 
Francis, Hasan, and Zhu (2014) document a 5% increase in the loan price during the period 
from 1990 to 2010.  
More importantly, the stability of the entire financial system is at risk during periods of 
high policy uncertainty. Bank failures are more likely to occur following gubernatorial 
elections (Liu and Ngo, 2014), while bailouts are unlikely to happen during election years 
(Dam and Koetter, 2012). Governments are more likely to bail out banks after elections, since 
politicians are reluctant to act before the elections due to the political costs associated with firm 
failures (Brown and Dinc, 2005). Similarly, electoral cycles, as well as the power and the 
ideology of the government, can affect the stability of the banking sector, as shown by Eichler 
and Sobański (2016), who study the relationship between national politics and the distance-to-
default for Eurozone banks. Their findings suggest that the impact of national political factors 
on banks’ stability is much more pronounced for large and weakly capitalized banks. Large 
banks are typically too big to fail and thus strongly rely on governmental support during periods 
of distress. Conversely, highly capitalized banks are more immune to political uncertainty.  
2.2 Capital shortfall and systemic risk  
A firm is systemically important if its failure contributes to a system-wide failure. Firm failures 
are more likely to occur during periods of elevated uncertainty because, during such periods, 
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other firms cannot acquire a failed firm due to the aggregate capital shortfall and so cannot 
resolve the temporary instability (Acharya, Engle, and Richardson, 2012). Motivated by this, 
Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2016) develop the SRISK 
indicator, which is a market-data-based risk measure that calculates the expected capital 
shortfall conditional on a severe market downturn and is an increasing function of the systemic 
risk and leverage.6  
Due to the multiple dimensions of systemic risk, it is almost impossible for a single 
measure to capture all its aspects. Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014) compare the capital 
shortfall that is generated by the regulatory stress tests with that generated by the SRISK 
indicator. They show that the rankings of financial institutions based on these two measures 
are correlated when the required capitalization is a function of the total assets, and hence, they 
suggest that regulatory stress tests must include a market risk component so as to improve their 
accuracy. Benoit, Hurlin, and Perignon (2019) compare the SRISK indicator and other market-
data-based systemic risk measures with the systemic risk-scoring methodology of the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision (2013), and they find that a key advantage of the former is 
that they can easily be implemented and compared, unlike the regulatory approach, since they 
are based on publically available data.  
Brownlees and Engle (2016) demonstrate that the SRISK indicator identified the financial 
firms with the largest capital shortfalls as early as 2005. These firms were Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers, which all faced substantial financial 
problems during the recent GFC. Thus, the authors show the importance of their measure as an 
early warning indicator. Following the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, large 
commercial banks, such as Citigroup, Bank of America, and JP Morgan, join the list of the 
                                                          
6 Among others, Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012), Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012), Hansen (2014), and 
Silva, Kimura, and Sobreiro (2017) provide extensive surveys of the systemic risk measures. 
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most important systemic risk contributors. As the crisis deepens (August 2008), this list is 
extended to include AIG, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia Bank. Between 2007 and 2009, the US 
Federal Reserve carried out several recapitalization programs, the most notable and extensive 
of these being the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The majority of the financial firms 
identified above as being major systemic risk contributors received government aid. For 
example, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were seized by the US government and placed under 
conservatorship, while Wachovia Bank was sold to Citigroup with the help of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which absorbed the losses. Citigroup, Bank of America 
(which acquired Merrill Lynch), AIG, JP Morgan (which purchased Bear Sterns), and Morgan 
Stanley all received aid via TARP. Lehman Brothers was the only systemic firm to file for 
bankruptcy in September 2008.  Overall, during the recent financial crisis, the large financial 
firms with severe capital shortfalls (as proxied by the SRISK indicator) were eventually bailed 
out by governments due to being “too big to fail.” 
 
3. Data and methodology 
Our empirical analysis is based on a monthly panel of 1,162 financial firms, as defined in the 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).7 Table 1 presents the definitions of the five 
financial sectors included in our analysis (Diversified and Regional Banks, Investment Banking 
and Diversified Capital Markets, Insurance Services, Diversified Financial Services, and 
Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts).  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
                                                          
7 The GICS is an industry classification developed by MSCI and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) for use by the global 
financial community.  
13 
 
We use the SRISK indicator as a measure of systemic risk and the GEPU index as a measure 
of global economic policy uncertainty (henceforth, we use the terms economic policy 
uncertainty, policy uncertainty, and uncertainty interchangeably). We take a global view by 
investigating the effect of policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall in the case of a new crisis 
in five regions (North and South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa). Our sample period (June 
2000 to December 2016) is limited to the availability of the SRISK data.8 In the following 
sections, we provide detailed descriptions of the indices and datasets employed. 
3.1 Measuring the capital shortfall 
Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2016) define 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 as 
the capital shortfall of firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡 during a systemic event calculated as: 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − (1 − 𝑘)(1 − 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡)𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡                               (1) 
where 𝑘 is the prudential capital ratio, which is equal to 5.5% for European firms and 8% for 
non-European ones;9 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of the debt; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is firm i’s market 
capitalization; 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the long-run marginal expected shortfall, which is equal to 1 −
𝑒(𝑙𝑛(1−𝑑)𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡); 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the beta coefficient with respect to the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) world index, which is estimated using a dynamic conditional beta model 
(Engle, 2002); and 𝑑 is the threshold of a six-month market decline (or systemic crisis event), 
the default value of which is set to -40%. The SRISK indicator combines two characteristics 
that are essential in terms of measuring the capital shortfall: (1) the liabilities and the size of 
                                                          
8 We wish to thank the V-Lab team members for making the data available on the V-Lab website 
(https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/). Since we analyze the global effect of policy uncertainty on firms’ capital shortages, 
we use the GMES database of V-Lab. The database includes only the major global financial firms so as to calculate 
the expected capital shortfall of a systemically important firm in the event of another crisis.  
9 V-Lab uses a different capital ratio for European firms due to the difference in dividend accounting. For more 




the financial institution, and (2) the common shock that affects the financial system through 
the 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆 term.10 
Table 2 presents the countries/nations included in our sample, the number of monthly 
observations, the number of firms, the average market capitalization, and the average quasi-
leverage ratio per country.11 For a firm to be included in our analysis, it must have at least 12 
monthly observations of positive SRISK (corresponding to the capital shortfall).12 As 
mentioned above, our sample is based on 1,162 firms that are divided into five regions: North 
America (191), South America (75), Europe (407), Asia (463), and Africa (26). Some 25 
countries have less than five firms, whereas nine countries/nations (China, France, Hong Kong, 
India, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the US) have more than 30 firms in our sample. 
The average quasi-leverage ratio equals 9.70, and it ranges from 1.59 (Curacao) to 48.51 
(Slovenia). 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Table 3 (Panel A) presents summary statistics for the global and regional SRISK for the 
full study period.13 The SRISK indicator is reported in millions of USD. At the global level, the 
average capital shortfall is close to 8,248 million USD, and it ranges from 10 to 105,492 million 
USD. The total capital shortage need at the end of 2016 is estimated to be close to 3 trillion 
USD, which reveals the possible economic impact of a financial crisis. There is significant 
variation among the firms, with the least (most) capital shortage being observed as the 1% 
                                                          
10 Following the suggestion of Brownlees and Engle (2016) and Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2015), we only 
use the positive SRISK values, since we want to investigate how policy uncertainty affects the amount of capital 
that firms will need during a severe market decline. Within this framework, a well-capitalized firm that will not 
need to raise new capital during severe crises is one for which the SRISK ≤ 0. In the empirical part of the paper 
(see Section 7.1.5), we also investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on well-capitalized firms. 
11 The quasi-leverage ratio is defined as: (𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 −𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃) 𝐶𝐴𝑃⁄ , where 
CAP is the firm market capitalization. 
12 The SRISK indicator is a daily measure of the capital shortfall in the event of a crisis, and we calculate the 
monthly SRISK as the average of the daily observations for each firm. For a firm to be included in our monthly 
analysis, it must have at least ten daily observations of positive SRISK. 
13 To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized all the variables at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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(99%) quantile equals 10 (105,492). The region that contributes the most (least) to the 
aggregate capital shortfall is North America (Africa), since the mean capital shortfall is equal 
to 11,161 (1,376). European firms require more capital than Asian and South America firms. 
Panel B in Table 3 presents summary statistics of the SRISK for the five financial sectors. The 
average capital shortfall for the Banks, Capital Markets, Insurances, Diversified Financial 
Services, and Mortgage REITs is equal to 8,786, 12,962, 6,722, 1,737, and 276, respectively. 
There is significant within variation in the five sectors. For example, the median capital 
shortfall for the Banks equals 1,665, while the 25% (75%) quantile equals 384 (5,838).  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
3.2 Measuring policy uncertainty 
Relying on political variables to examine the effect of policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall 
may not be appropriate, since these variables (1) only capture periods of uncertainty around 
election months, which means that we do not know anything about the level of uncertainty 
during non-election months; (2) do not quantify the change in uncertainty between periods; and 
(3) do not capture other events that may be related to policy uncertainty. To this end, we use 
the GEPU index proposed by Davis (2016) to capture the uncertainty that arises not only from 
the political environment, but also from policymakers themselves. The GEPU index is a GDP-
weighted average of 18 country-specific EPU indices (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK, and the US). Each country-specific index measures the relative frequency of 
articles published in local newspapers that cover issues regarding the economy (E), policy (P), 
and uncertainty (U).  
Figure 1 plots the GEPU index for the period from June 2000 to December 2016. It 
ranges from 50 to 277, and it shows spikes not only during periods of elections or referenda 
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(e.g., the June 2016 Brexit referendum), but also during periods most likely related to specific 
policy-changing events (e.g., the Gulf War, 9/11 terrorist attacks, 2008 GFC).14 Figure 1 also 
presents the total SRISK as the sum of individual firms’ SRISK. There is a clear positive relation 
between the two variables, with a correlation coefficient of 0.62 (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 = 11.14). 
Therefore, based on the graphical analysis, there are indications that policy uncertainty and the 
SRISK move in tandem. In the empirical part of this paper (Section 4), we further investigate 
whether this relation is statistically and economically significant. Panel C of Table 3 presents 
summary statistics for the GEPU index. The average value is equal to 111.01, with a standard 
deviation of 43.13, and it ranges from 50.26 (July 2007) to 277.09 (November 2016). The 
minimum value of the GEPU index occurs a few months prior to the start of the GFC, while 
the two highest values coincide with two major political events, namely the Brexit referendum 
and the US presidential elections.  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
3.3 Empirical methodology 
Our baseline panel model for testing the effect of policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall is 
similar to the specification used by Gulen and Ion (2016) and is as follows: 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑀𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
where 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the arithmetic SRISK average of firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡; 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of the GEPU index in month 𝑡 − 1;  𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the 
annualized standard deviation of firm 𝑖′s returns in month 𝑡 − 1, as provided by V-Lab; 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of firm 𝑖′s market capitalization in month 𝑡 − 1, which proxies 
                                                          
14 Baker, Bloom, Canes-Wrone, Davis, and Rodden (2014) attribute the increase in the EPU to secular growth in 
government and political polarization. 
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for the firm size (market capitalization is highly correlated with the total assets, rank correlation 
of 75%); and 𝛼𝑖 is the firm fixed effects. We include a set of seasonal monthly dummy variables 
(𝑀𝑁𝑇𝑡) to control for the possible seasonality in the capital requirements.
15 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the period from June 2007 to June 2009, and 0 
otherwise.16 The standard errors are clustered at the firm and calendar-month levels to take into 
account the potential cross-sectional and serial correlation in 𝑖,𝑡 (Petersen, 2009). Following 
the work of Gulen and Ion (2016), who investigate the effect of the US EPU index on corporate 
investments, we do not include the time fixed effects in Equation (2), since the GEPU index is 
common for every firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and hence, the time fixed effects would have mechanically 
absorbed the effect of the GEPU index on the capital shortage. However, to take into account 
the other factors that may also affect the SRISK, we include a set of control variables (𝑀𝑡−1) in 
Equation (2) spanning stock market, macroeconomic, and uncertainty-oriented variables.17 
More specifically, we use three sets of control variables: 
1. Firm-specific variables: 𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the annualized standard deviation of firm 𝑖’s stock returns 
in month 𝑡, as provided by V-Lab, and it captures the firm-specific uncertainty. We 
hypothesize that the standard deviation of the stock returns should be positively related to 
the SRISK, since an increase in the risk coincides with periods of market turbulence (Kelly, 
Pástor, and Veronesi, 2016). 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of 
firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and it accounts for the different sizes of firms.  
                                                          
15 More specifically, we include 11 dummy variables in our baseline equation. For example, the dummy variable 
for January equals 1 if the month is January, and 0 otherwise. Gulen and Ion (2016) use the same procedure to 
account for seasonality in their dataset.    
16 The crisis period includes: (1) the pre-Lehman Brothers period (from June 2007 to September 2008), which was 
characterized by the interventions of the central banks; (2) the global crisis period (October 2008 to December 
2008); and (3) the aftermath of the global crisis (January 2009 to June 2009), during which the recovery started.  
17 One other possible set of candidate control variables is the balance sheet data. Since these data are suitable for 
quarterly and yearly analysis, we cannot include them in our baseline model. However, in Equation (2), we add 
the lag value of the SRISK that is, by construction, a function of the total equity, total asset, and debt. Therefore, 
we have indirectly taken the balance sheet data into account. 
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2. Market variables:  𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the excess market return of the developed markets. We obtain 
the market index data from Kenneth French’s website. We prefer to use a global stock 
market index rather than country-specific indices because we want to measure the global 
systemic effect on the capital shortfall. We hypothesize that when market conditions are 
positive, the required capital should be lower, since an increase in the market capitalization 
of firm 𝑖 is associated with less capital shortage. This hypothesis is in line with the fact that 
the SRISK is a positive function of the market conditions. 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the annualized 
monthly standard deviation of the developed stock markets index returns. The higher the 
market risk, the higher the capital needs should be. We also use the 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 index, which we 
obtain from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, as a market-related uncertainty proxy. 
The implied volatility index is positively related to the GEPU index (Baker, Bloom, and 
Davis, 2016), and it is negatively related to the quarterly growth rate of the real US GDP 
(Gulen and Ion, 2016). Hence, the GEPU index may not contain additional information to 
the VIX index. 
3. Macroeconomic variables: 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑡 is the US business index of Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti 
(2009), which measures the economic conditions in real time because it combines weekly, 
monthly, and quarterly data to estimate the current state of the economy.18 We calculate the 
monthly index as the average of the daily index. Positive (negative) values indicate an 
improvement (deterioration) in the economic conditions. We hypothesize that the relation 
should be negative, since during economic crises firms will need more capital to cope with 
the financial problems that they will face. We also use the corporate spread 
(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡), which is calculated as the difference between Moody’s BBB and AAA 
US corporate bond yield, as a measure of the financial conditions. We hypothesize that the 
                                                          




relation should be positive, since higher spread values are associated with worse economic 
conditions, and hence, with higher capital needs. Finally, we use the difference between 
the ten-year Treasury constant maturity rate and the three-month Treasury constant 
maturity rate (𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡) as an alternative proxy for the economic conditions.
19, 20 
Panel D in Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables 
included in Equation (2).   
 
4. The effect of economic policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall 
4.1 The average effect of policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall 
Table 4 (Panel A) presents our baseline model results for all the countries for the 2000–2016 
period. We consider five specifications of Equation (2) so as to examine whether policy 
uncertainty contains incremental information over the three sets of control variables described 
in Section 3.3. Overall, our results show that policy uncertainty is positively and statistically 
significantly related to the future level of the capital shortfall in the case of a new crisis. As 
Column (1) of Table 4 shows, when policy uncertainty increases by 100%, the SRISK increases 
by 88.9%. The significance of the coefficient of policy uncertainty remains intact when we 
include the lagged value of the SRISK, even if the coefficient decreases from 0.889 to 0.177 
(Column (2)). However, the long-run effect is equal to 1.017 (=0.177/(1-0.826)). Columns (3)–
(5) present the results when the control variables are included. With the exception of the 
                                                          
19 We obtain the data for the corporate and term spread from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org/). 
20 All the macroeconomic variables are US-based, as similar data at the global level are not available. However, 
these variables are appropriate since the US economy affects the global economic conditions, and in this respect, 
a common global factor affects both national and regional economies. For example, Kose, Lakatos, Ohnsorge, 
and Stocker (2017) show that positive and negative developments in the US economy affect the global economy, 
while Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) demonstrate that a world factor is a source of local variability and hence 
that there is a world business cycle.  
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corporate spread, ADS, and SDMKT, all the variables are statistically significantly related to 
the capital shortfall.  
In Column (5), which presents the results of our baseline model including all the control 
variables, we observe that the coefficient of policy uncertainty is positive, statistically 
significant, and equal to 0.176. A 100% increase in policy uncertainty is related to a 17.6% 
increase, on average, in the capital shortage, given the effect of all the other factors.21 This 
increase is statistically and economically significant, since at the end of 2016 the total capital 
shortage in the case of a crisis period was close to $3,000,000 million. Thus, the 17.6% increase 
corresponds to $528 billion more required capital. Even a modest increase in the GEPU index 
is related to a significant increase in the capital shortfall. For example, if the GEPU increases 
by one standard deviation or 38.85% (= 43.13 111.01⁄  ), the SRISK will increase by 6.84% 
(= 0.176 × 38.85%), which corresponds to an additional $205 billion in capital in the case 
of a crisis at the end of 2016. To put these amounts into perspective, the Capital Purchase 
Program used $205 billion from the funds of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which 
amounted to $700 billion.22 With respect to the control variables, both the firm standard 
deviation and the term spread are positively related to the future capital shortage, while the 
global market returns and VIX are negatively related. Overall, the effect of policy uncertainty 
remains intact after the inclusion of the full set of control variables, and it also remains 
statistically and economically significant. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
A potential concern regarding our results is that the GEPU index may capture the effect 
of general economic uncertainty and not just the effect of policy-related uncertainty. Events 
                                                          
21 A natural question that arises here is whether the GEPU index has ever increased by 100%. The five highest 
monthly increases in the GEPU are: 119% (2001M09: terrorist attacks), 92% (2008M09: GFC), 92% (2016M11: 
US presidential elections), 85% (2016M6: Brexit referendum), and 64% (2000M11: US presidential elections).  




such as financial crises, wars, and recessions tend to increase both policy uncertainty and 
overall macroeconomic uncertainty. To ascertain that the GEPU index contains incremental 
information for the SRISK relative to the alternative measures of macroeconomic/financial 
uncertainty, we enrich our baseline specification with four proxies of uncertainty. First, we 
employ the real and financial uncertainty measures of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). 
Second, we employ the financial stress indicator provided by the Office of Financial 
Research.23 Finally, to better proxy for the stock market uncertainty, we also consider the stock 
market return dispersion, which is calculated as the cross-sectional standard deviation 
(𝐶𝑆𝑉𝑡) of the monthly stock returns. Garcia, Mantilla-García, and Martellini (2014) show that 
the return dispersion is related to economic uncertainty and also forecasts stock returns.  
Our results are reported in Table 4, Panel B. In more detail, Columns (6)–(9) report our 
results when each competing variable is included one at a time, while Column (10) reports a 
specification with all the variables. In all cases, the coefficient of the GEPU index remains 
positive and statistically significant, while the majority of the competing uncertainty proxies 
are insignificant. The GEPU effect is very close to our baseline specification, since it ranges 
from 0.170 to 0.177, and its significance remains intact.   
4.2 The evolution of the policy uncertainty effect over time 
We now take a closer look at how the relationship between policy uncertainty and the capital 
shortfall evolves over time. To this end, we follow the approach of Gulen and Ion (2016) and 
extend our baseline model to include further lags between the dependent and independent 
variables. We run 24 regressions, corresponding to lags 1 through 24 for a two-year horizon, 
and we plot the coefficients of the lagged GEPU (the horizontal axis presents the lags) in Figure 
                                                          
23 We obtain the data from Professor Ludvigson’s website (https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-





2. All the coefficients are highly statistically significant, with the exception of lag 24. As is 
apparent from Figure 2, the impact of the GEPU on the SRISK is hump-shaped, reaching a peak 
at about 11 months and then steadily declining up to the two-year horizon. More specifically, 
the coefficient values increase from 0.176 at lag 1 to 0.514 at lag 11 and then steadily decrease 
to an insignificant value at lag 24. Overall, our results show that policy uncertainty can exert a 
significant positive long-term impact on the capital shortfall of up to two years in duration in 
the case of a new crisis.  
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
4.3 Out-of-sample predictability 
The evidence detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 shows that economic policy uncertainty is related 
to future capital needs and also contains incremental forecasting information relative to other 
financial and economic factors. Given that our evidence is based on an in-sample regression, a 
question arises concerning whether or not the predictive power of the GEPU index holds in an 
out-of-sample setting. To this end, we employ the predictive accuracy test of Clark and West 
(2007) to examine whether policy uncertainty statistically improves the forecasting power of 
the following benchmark models by including in each of them the lagged GEPU index 
(𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1) and calculating the one-month-ahead prediction errors: 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 (3a) 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡 (3b) 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡 (3c) 









𝐸𝑃𝑈is the prediction error of the model that includes the GEPU index. The related test 
statistic is calculated by regressing the quantity 2𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡(𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑃𝑈) on a constant with 
clustered standard errors at the firm and calendar-month levels. For our analysis, we use the 
first 120 monthly observations and calculate the prediction errors. Then, we consecutively add 
one month into our sample and repeat the procedure until the end of the sample period. 
Table 5 reports the results of the out-of-sample study. The GEPU index improves the 
forecasting power of the benchmark models, since in all cases the prediction error is always 
lower than that of the benchmark model. More specifically, the adjusted difference in the mean 
square prediction errors ranges from 0.007 to 0.213, and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level. The extended model (Column 3) that includes the GEPU index appears 
superior to the more parsimonious specifications because its average forecasting error is the 
lowest among all the models considered. To summarize, our results hold not only in sample, 
but also out of sample, which implies that economic policy uncertainty is a major factor that 
forecasts the future capital needs of firms in a severe market decline and conveys more relative 
information about the capital shortfall than other economic and financial variables. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
5.  How does policy uncertainty affect the capital shortfall? 
In this section, we seek to reveal the mechanisms by which policy uncertainty increases the 
future level of the capital shortfall in the event of a severe market decline. To address this issue, 
we follow two approaches. The first approach stems from the calculation of the capital shortfall 
and its decomposition into its components, namely (a) systemic risk and (b) leverage. The 
second approach is more economically intuitive and relates to the decrease in private 





5.1 Capital shortfall components and policy uncertainty 
Kelly, Pástor, and Veronesi (2016) and Pástor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) show that an increase 
in policy uncertainty is negatively (positively) related to stock prices (volatility). This effect is 
expected to spill over to the markets (Scheffel, 2016) and to generate a systemic event. 
Therefore, an increase in policy uncertainty is associated with a decrease in stock prices, and 
since the SRISK indicator is a market-based measure and a function of the market decline, it is 
also expected to increase. Moreover, Lee, Lee, Zeng, and Hsu (2017) explore the long- and 
short-term effects of policy uncertainty on the leverage decisions of financial institutions, and 
they show that the long-term (short-term) economic policy uncertainty is positively 
(negatively) related to the leverage ratio. They point out that financial institutions prefer to 
reduce their leverage ratio in an effort to deal with short-term instability, while they increase it 
in response to long-term uncertainty so as to achieve their long-term goals (e.g., to increase 
their profits). Since the SRISK is a positive function of the leverage ratio, the long-term 
component of policy uncertainty will increase the capital shortfall. 
To shed light on the driving forces behind the capital shortfall increases, we decompose 
the SRISK indicator into the following two components: (a) systemic risk and (b) leverage risk. 
More specifically, we employ the following alternative definition/decomposition of SRISK = 
𝑘(𝐿𝑉𝐺𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡) − (1 − 𝑘) ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝑒
(𝑙𝑛(1−𝑑)∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡). The first part is the natural 
logarithm of the leverage risk component (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘(𝐿𝑉𝐺𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡)), while 
the second part is the negative of the natural logarithm of the systemic risk component 
(𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = −(1 − k) ∗ CAPi,t ∗  e
(ln(1−d)∗Betai,t)). We estimate our baseline specification 
(Equation 2) by replacing the SRISK with its two components, and we present our findings in 
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Table 6. For both components, the effect of the GEPU index on the SRISK is positive and 
statistically significant. When policy uncertainty increases by 100%, the leverage component 
increases by 1%, while the systemic risk component increases by 3.7%. Therefore, both 
components contribute to the increase in the capital shortfall, with the effect of the systemic 
risk being more economically important.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
5.2 Profitability, investment and policy uncertainty 
To explore whether the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall is driven 
by firm profitability and/or investment, we re-estimate our baseline specification, i.e., equation 
(2), by adding two interaction terms. The first is the (lagged) interaction term between 
economic policy uncertainty and firms’ equity to assets ratio (ETA) proxying for firm level 
investment.24 The second is the (lagged) interaction term between economic policy uncertainty 
and firms’ return on equity (ROE) proxying for firm level profitability. We do not include the 
main terms of these two variables (ROE and ETA) in the model because they are highly 
collinear with the relevant interaction terms. We estimate two variants of this model, one at the 
global level by employing the GEPU index and one at the country-specific level by employing 
the country-level (local) EPU (LEPU).25 
Our results (reported in Panel A of Table 7) show that both interaction terms are 
statistically significant and bear a negative sign, as expected, irrespective of whether we 
employ the GEPU or the LEPU. The marginal effects of the ETA and ROE (-0.027 and -0.004, 
                                                          
24 The rationale behind employing equity capital as a proxy for firm investment is that via equity increases, firms 
finance new investment. These equity increases can be funded by retained earnings, new public equity issuance 
and/or government subsidies.  
25 The country-specific indices are available for Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Hong Kong, Mexico, India, Ireland, Japan, S. Korea, Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, the UK, 
and the US.   
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respectively, reported in Panel B) reveal that the impact of economic policy uncertainty running 
through firms’ investment is more pronounced than that running through profitability. 
 [Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
6. Tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns  
Does global economic policy uncertainty affect the capital shortfall or is the relation reversed? 
To put it differently, do the market conditions underlying the SRISK calculation affect the 
economic policies regarding taxes, interest rates, regulation frameworks, and unemployment? 
The answers to these questions will reveal the importance of economic policy uncertainty and 
also alleviate any concern that the elevated capital shortfall created during a crisis period can 
itself lead to policy uncertainty. To address these issues, we (a) conduct an instrumental 
variable analysis and placebo tests and (b) employ exogenous shocks. 
6.1 Instrumental variable analysis and placebo tests 
An appropriate instrument should be significantly related to economic policy uncertainty and 
only affect capital shortfall through that relation. We consider two variables to serve as 
instruments in this regard, namely (a) the migration fear index and (b) the partisan conflict 
index (Azzimonti, 2018).  
The migration fear index measures the migration-related fears in France, Germany, the 
UK, and the US. It measures the relative frequency of articles published in local newspapers 
with at least one term from each of the following categories: migration (M) and fear (F). We 
use the average value of the four local indices to construct the migration fear index (MFEAR).26 
The migration fear index may serve as a useful instrument because “The recent influx of 
                                                          
26 We obtain the data for the migration fear index from the Economic Policy Uncertainty website 
(http://www.policyuncertainty.com/immigration_fear.html). Since these indices are calculated every quarter, we 
perform a linear extrapolation to generate the monthly indices. 
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refugees to Europe has stoked security fears and created anxiety about the social and economic 
consequences.”27 Migration fear is related to economic policy uncertainty (the in-sample 
correlation coefficient is equal to 0.45), since it has an effect on labor markets, housing markets, 
schooling, social services, and government spending (Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005; Boeri, De 
Phillippis, Patacchini, and Pellizzari, 2015). Thus, it leads to economic policy changes. 
Therefore, the first condition necessary for the MFEAR index to be relevant as an instrument 
is met. As for the second condition, it is not apparent how the increased fear of immigration 
can directly force firms to increase their capital. 
The partisan conflict index (Azzimonti, 2018) measures the political disagreement 
among US politicians at the federal level.28 The index is constructed through keyword searches 
of major US newspapers, and it tracks lawmakers’ disagreements about policy both within and 
between political parties. The higher the values of the index, the greater the conflict in the US 
political scene. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the index “tends to 
increase near elections and during debates over such contentious policies as the debt ceiling 
and health-care reform.” Partisan conflict is related to economic policy uncertainty (the in-
sample correlation coefficient is equal to 0.54) because it renders the legislation process more 
difficult. During periods of high political polarization, the government becomes dysfunctional 
and policy changes become unpredictable (Groseclose and McCarty, 2000; McCarty, Poole, 
and Rosenthal, 2006; McCarty, 2012). Thus, the first condition necessary for the index to be 
relevant as an instrument in our research is satisfied. As for the second condition, it is not 
apparent how US partisan conflict can directly drive the global SRISK.  
                                                          
27 https://voxeu.org/article/immigration-fears-and-policy-uncertainty. 





As previously stated, the direct effect of conflicts within or between political parties 
renders the legislative process more difficult and also creates concerns and uncertainties about 
expected or unexpected changes in economic policies. Therefore, the uncertainty regarding 
policies created through partisan conflict might not affect the SRISK and its components 
directly, but rather through its effect on policy uncertainty. Thus, the exclusion condition is 
also satisfied. Even though our study is global in nature, due to the lack of relevant data for 
other countries, we use the partisan conflict index that refers to the US political environment. 
We believe that this strengthens our choice of an instrumental variable because it is not certain 
that the political disagreements in the US would directly affect the capital shortfalls of firms in 
other countries. Yet, the decision to use the US partisan conflict index may give rise to a 
question regarding its validity as an instrument, since it could be influenced by business cycles 
in the US and thus by the global capital shortfall when the US market is included. To address 
these concerns, we consider two specifications: one including all the firms and the second 
excluding the US firms. 
Following the approach of Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018), we implement a two-stage 
instrumental variable approach involving a time-series regression in the first stage and a panel 
regression in the second stage. This approach addresses the overstated correlation between the 
endogenous variable and its instrument, since these variables do not vary cross-sectionally. The 
standard errors of the first stage regression are Newey and West (1987) adjusted. In Panels A, 
B, and C of Table 8, we present the results of the first- and second-stage regressions by using 
the migration fear index, the partisan conflict index, and the partisan conflict index, 
respectively, with the latter excluding the US firms. For the first-stage regression employing 
the migration fear index (Panel A), the 𝛽1 coefficient is 0.136, and it is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Hence, the regression confirms the expected positive and significant effect of 
the migration fear index on the GEPU (the F-statistic of the regression equals 15.76). The 
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relevant first-stage regression results for the partisan conflict index (Panels B and C) show that 
the inclusion or exclusion of the US firms does not affect our results, since in both cases the 𝛽1 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant.  
To capture the exogenous variation in policy uncertainty, we re-estimate the average 
effect of global economic policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall by using the natural 
logarithm of the fitted values (𝐺𝐸𝑃?̂?) from the first-stage regression in each case. The standard 
errors of the second-stage regressions are bootstrapped (500 replications) because we use 
estimated regressors. The second-stage regression for the 𝑀𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅 shows that the coefficient 
of the fitted 𝐺𝐸𝑃?̂? equals 0.167 and is highly statistically significant. Similarly, in both cases 
in which the partisan conflict index is employed, the impact on the capital shortfall remains 
positive, statistically significant, and of a similar magnitude to our baseline specification.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
To further alleviate concerns about endogeneity and the potentially spurious relationship 
between the GEPU index and the SRISK indicator, we conduct a series of placebo tests by 
following the approach of Berger, Guedhami, Kim, and Xinming (2018). We construct the 
𝐺𝐸𝑃?̃? by randomly selecting values without replacement from the original series of the GEPU. 
Then, we estimate the regression coefficients by using 100 different samples from the random 
𝐺𝐸𝑃?̃?. In Panel D of Table 8, we present the relevant results. Based on these 100 samples, the 
average coefficient estimate on the GEPU is -0.002. More importantly, in only two of the 100 
samples is the coefficient positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In general, the 
results support our intuition and show that the 𝐺𝐸𝑃?̃? is not statistically significantly related to 





6.2 Employing exogenous shocks  
In this section, we employ exogenous shocks that plausibly affect economic policy uncertainty, 
but do not directly affect the capital shortfall. These shocks stem from the political and/or social 
environment of the various countries worldwide. They impact economic policy uncertainty 
either at the global (GEPU) or the country-specific level (LEPU), which in turn impacts the 
capital shortfall of firms. We focus on both the global EPU and the country-level (local) EPUs. 
For the GEPU, we consider the following (cardinal) variables at the country-year level that 
serve as exogenous shocks: (i) the number of general strikes, which take values from 1 to 13, 
and zero otherwise; (ii) the number of purges, which take values from 1 to 4, and zero 
otherwise; and (iii) the number of riots, which take values from 1 to 28, and zero otherwise. 
For the LEPU, we consider the following (cardinal) variables: (i) the number of government 
crises, which take values from 1 to 4, and zero otherwise; (ii) the number of major cabinet 
changes, which take values from 1 to 3, and zero otherwise; and (iii) the number of changes in 
the effective executive, which take values from 1 to 3, and zero otherwise.29 We employ in 
equation (2) the interaction term between the natural logarithm of (1+exogenous shock) and 
the GEPU or LEPU, respectively, for each one of the aforementioned shocks. The coefficient 
of each interaction term captures the incremental impact of economic policy uncertainty 
(GEPU or LEPU) on the capital shortfall for the treated group relative to the control group.  
Table 9 reports the results using our quarterly level dataset. Panel A shows the results for 
GEPU, whereas Panel B shows the results for the country-specific policy uncertainty index 
(LEPU). The coefficients for the interaction terms for GEPU and LEPU are positive and, in 
                                                          
29 We obtain these data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). The CNTS is a database 
comprised of more than 200 years of annual data (from 1815 onward) for over 200 countries and covering political, 
legislative, and economic matters, as well as domestic conflict events (terrorism/guerrilla warfare, assassinations, 
general strikes, major government crises, anti-government demonstrations, revolutions, riots, and purges). 
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almost all cases, statistically significant thus providing strong support for the causal effect of 
economic policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall of firms. 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
7. Sensitivity analysis and further robustness tests 
In the following sections, we further analyze the effect of global economic policy uncertainty 
on the capital shortfall regionally, per type of financial firm, market threshold decline, and 
capital shortfall severance. We also consider well-capitalized firms and alternative regression 
specifications. 
7.1 Sensitivity analysis 
7.1.1 The regional effect of global economic policy uncertainty 
Based on our findings, we may question whether our results are attributed to a specific 
geographic region, or global policy uncertainty affects all regions equally. We expect a similar 
effect across all regions because most financial corporations operate in several countries, while 
the importance of regional risk has decreased over time, as markets have become more 
integrated (Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang, 2009). We further expect that economic policy 
uncertainty spillovers occur across countries, as shown by Klößner and Sekkel (2014). 
Following the approach of Klößner and Sekkel (2014), we calculate the Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2009) spillover measure for the country-specific LEPU indices. The spillover index is 
estimated to be 65.69%, thereby providing evidence in favor of the existence of policy 
uncertainty spillover effects among countries. We also re-estimate Equation (2) by including 
regional dummy variables for four regions (South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa), keeping 
North America as the base group, and the relevant interaction terms between these regional 
dummy variables and the 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1. Table 10 (Panel A1) presents the corresponding results. 
As is quickly apparent, the interaction terms are statistically insignificant, with the only 
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exception being the relevant term for Europe, which is statistically significant at the 10% level, 
indicating that the effect of the GEPU on the SRISK is similar across all regions.  
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
7.1.2 The effect of policy uncertainty on the financial sectors 
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) note that policy uncertainty matters significantly in relation 
to the defense, finance, healthcare, and construction sectors. Hence, it also matters in terms of 
determining the capital shortfall of other non-bank companies. We use the GICS to examine 
whether policy uncertainty affects the capital shortfall equally for all the financial sectors. 
Thus, we include four industry dummy variables in Equation (2) (Capital Markets, Insurances, 
Diversified Financial Services, and Mortgage REITs), keeping Banks as the base group, and 
keeping the relevant interaction terms between these industry dummy variables and the 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 consistent. 
Panel A2 in Table 10 reports the relevant findings. As the results suggest, the impact of 
policy uncertainty on three sectors, namely Capital Markets, Insurances, and Diversified 
Financial Services, is similar to that on Banks, since the relevant interaction terms are 
statistically insignificant. In turn, the impact of uncertainty on Mortgage REITs is almost 
double that seen in the case of Banks. This could be attributed to a possible large decline in 
real estate prices in the event of a crisis.  
7.1.3 Does the market decline threshold matter? 
The threshold for a six-month market decline is set as -40%, following the work of Acharya, 
Engle, and Richardson (2012) and Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2015). Brownlees and 
Engle (2016) set the threshold as -10% for their baseline scenario, and they also use a higher 
threshold (-20%) to examine the ranking sensitivity of the SRISK. Thus, we also consider three 
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more systemic event thresholds (-10%, -20%, and -30%) to investigate whether policy 
uncertainty also affects the capital shortfall in the case of a less severe market decline. 
Panel B1 of Table 10 presents the results of Equation (2) for the different crisis levels. 
Column 1 presents the results of our baseline scenario (a 40% decrease in the market), which 
can also be seen in Table 4 (Column 5). The overall results indicate that irrespective of the 
severity of the market decline, an increase in policy uncertainty is related to an increase in the 
capital shortfall. Hence, policy uncertainty is a significant factor in relation to the stability of 
the financial system. To explore whether the coefficient of the GEPU differs across the 
different columns in Panel B1, we conduct a coefficient difference test. Panel B2 in Table 10 
reports the results of the Z-test of the equality of the coefficients between the different market 
decline thresholds: -40% vs. -30%, -40% vs. -20%, -40% vs. -10%, -30% vs. -20%, -30 vs. -
10%, and -20% vs. -10%. In all cases, the differences are not statistically significant and thus 
the effect of global economic policy uncertainty on capital shortfall is statistically the same 
across alternative market decline thresholds. However, economic significance increases 
substantially with the decline of the stock market. For example, a 100% increase in economic 
policy uncertainty corresponds to around $321 billion additional capital at the end of 2016 in 
the event of a 10% market decline. In the event of a 40% market decline this figure increases 
to $528 billion.  
7.1.4 Capital shortfall severance and policy uncertainty 
Does the relation with global economic policy uncertainty remain intact for lower or higher 
levels of capital shortfall? The answer to this question is important because if the relation 
changes for different levels of capital shortfall, then the uncertainty that arises from politicians 
and policymakers will asymmetrically affect the capital shortfall in the case of a new crisis. To 
examine the effect of policy uncertainty on the capital shortfall levels, we estimate a quantile 
regression version of Equation (2) for a fine grid of quantiles ranging from the 10th to the 90th 
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quantile. Following the approach of Parente and Santos Silva (2016), we compute the standard 
errors that are asymptotically valid under conditions of heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster 
correlation. Table 10 (Panel C) presents the results for the firms with the least (10% quantile 
of the SRISK) to the most (90% quantile of the SRISK) capital shortfall. The overall results are 
in line with the previous evidence. Irrespective of whether the firm has the most or the least 
capital shortfall, policy uncertainty is positively related to the firm’s future required capital 
needs. For all the quantiles, the coefficient of the GEPU is positive, with an average value of 
0.115, and statistically significant. For the median (50%) quantile, the coefficient is equal to 
0.106, and it is lower than the benchmark least squares case of 0.176, which points to a 
negatively skewed distribution of the capital shortfall. The coefficients decrease monotonically 
(from 0.220 to 0.050), implying that at low (high) levels of capital shortfall, the importance of 
economic policy uncertainty is higher (lower). 
The percentage increase in the capital shortfall for the firms with the least capital 
shortage, which is associated with a one-standard-deviation increase, is 8.55% (= 0.220 ×
 38.85%). A different picture emerges when we examine the effect on the most important 
systemic firms. In this case, a one-standard-deviation increase in policy uncertainty is 
associated with, on average, a 1.94% (= 0.05 ×  38.85%) increase in the capital shortfall of 
the most systemic firms. For the financial firms that have the least and the most capital shortfall, 
statistically the effect of economic policy uncertainty is greater for the least than the ones with 
the most capital shortfall. However, the economic significance of this effect is reverse. The 
additional capital that will be required in case of a new crisis due to economic policy 
uncertainty for the financial firms that have the least capital shortfall (10th quantile) is over 
$350 million whereas for the firms with the most capital shortfall (90th quantile) is over $90 
billion. The latter is in accordance with what we would expect intuitively.  
7.1.5 Does policy uncertainty also affect well-capitalized firms? 
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Our findings thus far refer to under-capitalized financial firms, which will require additional 
capital in the event of a new crisis. However, does policy uncertainty also affect well-
capitalized firms during a crisis period? In this scenario, we use the absolute value of the SRISK 
of well-capitalized firms to estimate Equation (2), since the SRISK is negative for such firms. 
Table 11 presents our results for well-capitalized firms globally (Panel A), regionally (Panel 
B), and across different financial sectors (Panel C). As expected, we observe a negative 
(statistically significant) relationship between economic policy uncertainty and the capital 
surplus, which implies that an increase in policy uncertainty decreases the capital surplus. 
Comparing the absolute values of the coefficients of the capital shortfall and the surplus 
regressions (0.176 vs. 0.094) reveals that the effect of economic policy uncertainty is more 
pronounced for under-capitalized firms. As in the case of the capital shortfall, there are no 
differences between the regions, since the coefficients of the interaction terms are insignificant, 
with the exception of the coefficient for South America (at the 10% significance level). 
However, when considering the financial industries, we find an overall negative effect equal to 
-0.118, which is dampened for the Capital Markets, Insurances, and Mortgage REITs by 0.038, 
0.052, and 0.043, respectively. Therefore, the combined evidence in Tables 4 and 11 suggests 
that policy uncertainty during a crisis period matters (1) for under-capitalized firms, which due 
to their high capital needs will induce systemic instability in the global financial system, and 
(2) for well-capitalized firms, since such firms are also likely to be short of capital in the future. 
[Insert Table 11 around here] 
7.2 Further robustness checks 
We conduct several additional robustness tests. First, we employ additional econometric 
specifications. More specifically, we re-estimate our baseline model by employing as a 
dependent variable the last value of the SRISK indicator at month 𝑡 rather than the monthly 
average (reported in Appendix A, Table A1), in first differences (Table A2), not lagging the 
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GEPU and control variables (Table A3), normalizing the SRISK with the related firm market 
capitalization of firms (Table A4), and finally, at a quarterly frequency employing the total 
assets in lieu of the market capitalization as a control variable (Table A5).  
 Second, we address concerns about survivorship bias. In our analysis, we include all 
the firms available in the V-Lab database without taking into account whether they survived to 
the end of our sample period or not. It is worth mentioning here that the V-Lab database does 
not include all the financial firms in operation worldwide. It considers only the major global 
financial firms so as to calculate the expected capital shortfall of a systemically important firm. 
To mitigate concerns that our results are affected by this feature of the data, we conduct the 
following test. We randomly select banks from the sample and then, for those banks, we drop 
the data from a randomly selected month – different for each bank – from that month until the 
end of the study period. In other words, we impose a randomly selected removal for some of 
the bank-month observations as if these banks did not survive. Then, we re-run our baseline 
specification with this reduced sample and report the results in Table A6. Overall, we repeat 
this procedure several times and our results remain intact. 
Third, we employ country-specific indices (LEPU) of economic policy uncertainty 
rather than the GEPU. Since the GEPU is a GDP-weighted index, the LEPU will also allow us 
to examine whether the influence of economic policy uncertainty in the major countries drives 
our results. Table A7 in the Appendix presents the results of our baseline model (Equation (2)) 
using the LEPU of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Hong Kong, Mexico, India, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, 
Sweden, the UK, and the US. The coefficient of the LEPU equals 0.092, and it differs 
significantly from zero. Its magnitude is reduced, providing additional support for the existence 
of a spillover effect of policy uncertainty among countries. 
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Fourth, we take into account the effect of influential countries because our panel is not 
level by country. Hence, bigger countries are weighted with more firms. We first estimate a 
weighted panel regression of our baseline model and use as a weight the inverse number of 
observations from each country. Second, we examine whether there are significant differences 
between the effects of the GEPU on the SRISK of the most influential countries according to 
the number of observations (US, UK, Japan) versus the remaining countries. Panels A and B 
of Table A8 report the relevant findings. In both cases, there is a significant positive relation 
between the GEPU and the SRISK that is similar in magnitude to our baseline results (0.163 
and 0.175, respectively). More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term is not 
significant, which provides ample evidence that our results are not driven by the effect of the 
most influential countries.  
Finally, we offer an alternative way to address the issue of whether the GEPU not only 
reflects economic policy uncertainty, but is also contaminated with general financial market 
uncertainty. We apply a two-stage regression approach. In the first stage, we remove the effect 
of market conditions from the GEPU by running the following time-series regression: 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + ?̇?, where 𝑋 represents the market condition variable. As a 
proxy for the market conditions, we employ (a) the financial stress indicator of the Office of 
Financial Research, (b) the real uncertainty index of Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015), and (c) 
the financial uncertainty index of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). In the second stage, we 
estimate our baseline specification by substituting 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 for the residual (REPU) from the 
first-stage regression. Our findings are shown in Table A9. Irrespective of the market condition 
variable, the results reinforce the notion that it is economic policy uncertainty that affects the 
capital shortfall. More specifically, when we use the financial stress indicator (Panel A), the 
coefficient of the REPU equals 0.174, which differs significantly from zero. When we use the 
real uncertainty index (Panel B) and the financial uncertainty index (Panel C), the coefficients 
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Political instability and unclear policy decisions affect both the real economy and firms from 
various perspectives, including capital investments, mergers and acquisitions, and 
corporate/country spreads. The rigorous analysis in this paper sheds light on another effect of 
policy uncertainty, namely the effect on the capital shortfall of financial firms in the case of a 
new crisis. This paper extends the prior literature and provides new empirical evidence of that 
effect by employing Davis’s (2016) GEPU index and the SRISK indicator proposed by 
Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2016) as measures of the 
overall economic policy uncertainty and the capital shortfall, respectively.  
Our results indicate a strong positive relationship between policy uncertainty and the 
future level of the capital shortfall in the case of a severe market decline. We show that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the GEPU index is associated with a $205 billion increase in the 
capital shortage in the case of a new crisis at the end of 2016. We also seek to reveal the 
mechanisms by which policy uncertainty increases the future level of the capital shortfall in 
the event of a crisis. By decomposing the capital shortfall into its systemic risk and leverage 
components, we show that economic policy uncertainty has a greater effect on the systemic 
component than on the leverage component. This finding points to pronounced effects during 
economic downturns due to the interconnectedness of financial firms. More specifically, when 
policy uncertainty increases by 100%, the leverage component increases by 1%, while the 
systemic risk component increases by 3.7%.  
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Since the prior literature has identified the adverse consequences of policy uncertainty 
for firms’ performance, we further explore whether the transmission mechanism of policy 
uncertainty occurs via reduced firm profitability and/or investments during periods of high 
policy uncertainty. The results reveal that the impact of economic policy uncertainty running 
through investment is more pronounced than that running through profitability.  
We also extend the prior literature, which has predominantly focused on policy 
uncertainty in the US, by providing a global perspective when we analyze 1,162 financial firms 
across five regions (North and South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa). We document how 
economic policy uncertainty affects all the financial sectors similarly, with the exception of 
real estate investment trusts, for which the effect is more than two times higher than the average 
effect. This finding could be explained by the increased exposure of such companies to policy 
decisions and economic uncertainty during the crisis periods. Our findings are robust to the 
potential omitted variable bias, since we include the relevant sets of control variables for market 
and macroeconomic conditions as well as other sources of uncertainty. To identify the 
exogenous variation in economic policy uncertainty and to mitigate concerns about 
endogeneity and reverse causality, we apply an instrumental variable analysis, placebo tests, 
and an exogenous shocks analysis. The results corroborate our expectations and our main 
findings.  
As we describe in this paper, our results have important policy implications. We 
unambiguously show that the authorities have to take decisive and prompt action in the case of 
severe market turbulence. If they allow for any unnecessary delays, then their inactivity could 
cause additional costs for the economy as a whole. Taking into account the fact that external 
financing is more difficult to come by during crisis periods, we provide further evidence that 
during such periods, growing economic policy uncertainty leads to an increase in the capital 
shortages of financial firms.  
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We also contribute to the policy-oriented research on the limitations of the capital 
shortfall. In their recent study, Aikman, Haldane, Hinterschweiger, and Kapadia (2018) argue 
that one way to avoid capital shortfalls is the implementation of the qualitative elements of the 
Basel Accord III. One of these recommended elements is the counter-cyclical capital buffer, 
which takes into account the credit cycle (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). In 
our study, we further identify the GEPU as an additional monitoring tool that could be used to 
detect a potentially elevated capital shortfall. Since the GEPU and the SRISK are publicly 
available, it should be relatively easy to use them as additional qualitative elements.  
The findings of this study are also undoubtedly important for firms’ managers. We 
provide evidence that during periods of elevated policy uncertainty and a severe market 
downturn, firms face higher capital requirements than they originally expect. In other words, 
firms with low capital will face significant distress and the capital shortfalls might not be 
covered by the markets, since external financing is difficult to arrange during periods of 
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Table 1. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). 
The table presents the definitions of the firms that are used in our sample divided in 5 different financial sectors, according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). 
The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is an industry classification developed by MSCI and Standard & Poor's (S&P) for use by the global financial community. 
Definitions are provided from https://www.msci.com/gics.  
Banks 
Diversified Banks 
Large, geographically diverse banks with a national footprint whose revenues are derived primarily from conventional banking operations, have significant business 
activity in retail banking and small and medium corporate lending, and provide a diverse range of financial services. Excludes banks classified in the Regional Banks 
and Thrifts & Mortgage Finance Sub-Industries. Also excludes investment banks classified in the Investment Banking & Brokerage Sub-Industry. 
Regional Banks 
Commercial banks whose businesses are derived primarily from conventional banking operations and have significant business activity in retail banking and small and 
medium corporate lending. Regional banks tend to operate in limited geographic regions. Excludes companies classified in the Diversified Banks and Thrifts & 
Mortgage Banks sub-industries. Also excludes investment banks classified in the Investment Banking & Brokerage Sub-Industry. 
Capital Markets 
Asset Management & 
Custody Banks 
Financial institutions primarily engaged in investment management and/or related custody and securities fee-based services. Includes companies operating mutual 
funds, closed-end funds and unit investment trusts. Excludes banks and other financial institutions primarily involved in commercial lending, investment banking, 
brokerage and other specialized financial activities.  
Investment Banking & 
Brokerage 
Financial institutions primarily engaged in investment banking & brokerage services, including equity and debt underwriting, mergers and acquisitions, securities 




Financial institutions primarily engaged in diversified capital markets activities, including a significant presence in at least two of the following area: large/major 
corporate lending, investment banking, brokerage and asset management. Excludes less diversified companies classified in the Asset Management & Custody Banks 
or Investment Banking & Brokerage sub-industries. Also excludes companies classified in the Banks or Insurance industry groups or the Consumer Finance Sub-
Industry.  
Financial Exchanges & 
Data 
Financial exchanges for securities, commodities, derivatives and other financial instruments, and providers of financial decision support tools and products including 
ratings agencies 
Insurance 
Insurance Brokers Insurance and reinsurance brokerage firms. 
Life & Health Insurance 
Companies providing primarily life, disability, indemnity or supplemental health insurance. Excludes managed care companies classified in the Managed Health Care 
Sub-Industry. 
Multi-line Insurance Insurance companies with diversified interests in life, health and property and casualty insurance. 
Property & Casualty 
Insurance 
Companies providing primarily property and casualty insurance. 
Reinsurance Companies providing primarily reinsurance. 
Diversified Financial Services 
Other Diversified 
Financial Services 
Providers of a diverse range of financial services and/or with some interest in a wide range of financial services including banking, insurance and capital markets, but 
with no dominant business line. Excludes companies classified in the Regional Banks and Diversified Banks Sub-Industries. 
Multi-Sector Holdings 
A company with significantly diversified holdings across three or more sectors, none of which contributes a majority of profit and/or sales. Stakes held are predominantly 
of a non-controlling nature. Includes diversified financial companies where stakes held are of a controlling nature. Excludes other diversified companies classified in 
the Industrials Conglomerates Sub-Industry. 
Specialized Finance 
Providers of specialized financial services not classified elsewhere. Companies in this sub-industry derive a majority of revenue from one specialized line of business. 
Includes, but not limited to, commercial financing companies, central banks, leasing institutions, factoring services, and specialty boutiques. Excludes companies 
classified in the Financial Exchanges & Data sub-industry. 
Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
Mortgage REITs 
Companies or Trusts that service, originate, purchase and/or securitize residential and/or commercial mortgage loans. Includes trusts that invest in mortgage-backed 





Table 2. National and Regional Characteristics. 
The table presents the nations and regions in our sample for which we have data for SRISK, as defined in Equation (1). It also presents the number of monthly 
observations per country, the number of firms per country, the average leverage ratio, market capitalization of firms per country and firms’ region. The sample 
period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 











Argentina 767 4 11.40 3,142 S. America Luxembourg 815 7 9.44 1,391 Europe 
Australia 2808 16 7.10 18,312 Asia Malaysia 2998 17 6.86 3,704 Asia 
Austria 1659 12 12.96 3,809 Europe Malta 321 2 11.68 784 Europe 
Bahrain 102 1 7.39 4,156 Asia Mexico 550 5 3.99 6,919 S. America 
Belgium 2536 17 11.23 4,606 Europe Morocco 559 5 5.33 4,147 Africa 
Bermuda 2291 14 3.53 3,821 S. America Netherlands 1943 14 14.07 9,109 Europe 
Brazil 2429 22 4.85 12,751 S. America New Zealand 135 1 4.83 325 Asia 
Canada 5078 28 7.97 14,537 N. America Nigeria 495 3 5.86 2,398 Africa 
Cayman Islands 153 1 3.92 615 S. America Norway 1516 9 12.19 3,154 Europe 
Chile 2456 14 4.02 2,973 S. America Oman 153 1 6.20 2,778 Asia 
China 7816 70 5.07 15,909 Asia Pakistan 215 2 6.01 2,160 Asia 
Colombia 894 7 3.58 11,325 S. America Peru 799 6 5.68 3,990 S. America 
Croatia 198 1 8.29 2,278 Europe Philippines 1684 11 3.66 2,513 Asia 
Curacao 192 1 1.59 6,482 S. America Poland 2287 14 6.66 3,940 Europe 
Cyprus 411 4 31.71 1,880 Europe Portugal 662 4 22.40 4,227 Europe 
Czech 153 1 5.41 7,126 Europe Puerto Rico 199 1 13.33 3,670 S. America 
Denmark 1137 8 11.65 5,022 Europe Qatar 1370 11 3.15 6,084 Asia 
Egypt 292 2 5.20 2,565 Africa Romania 372 2 7.05 1,647 Europe 
Finland 924 5 7.96 3,951 Europe Russia 791 9 8.15 12,496 Europe 
France 6817 47 12.73 8,796 Europe Saudi Arabia 2172 18 3.32 8,607 Asia 
Germany 4469 29 19.13 8,817 Europe Singapore 3135 22 3.78 5,968 Asia 
Greece 2112 13 20.67 3,015 Europe Slovakia 144 1 8.85 10,945 Europe 
Guernsey 128 2 14.21 3,433 Europe Slovenia 29 1 48.51 64 Europe 
Hong Kong 8009 46 3.24 7,335 Asia South Africa 2732 16 7.16 5,370 Africa 
Hungary 330 2 9.04 3,891 Europe South Korea 2477 24 10.54 4,855 Asia 
India 8264 57 18.17 2,688 Asia Spain 2564 19 13.32 14,647 Europe 
Indonesia 2798 19 4.61 3,452 Asia Sweden 4204 23 5.55 6,436 Europe 
Ireland 682 4 23.08 11,592 Europe Switzerland 5979 39 9.56 9,588 Europe 
Israel 2109 12 14.44 2,103 Asia Taiwan 4052 26 9.27 3,399 Asia 
Italy 5002 33 16.96 7,075 Europe Thailand 2203 13 8.66 3,306 Asia 
Japan 9102 56 16.79 9,533 Asia Turkey 4016 24 6.65 3,507 Europe 
Jordan 626 6 5.42 2,168 Asia UAE 1847 13 5.21 5,109 Asia 
Kazakhstan 208 2 11.95 1,918 Asia Ukraine 238 2 13.26 958 Europe 
Kuwait 1008 7 5.14 5,596 Asia United Kingdom 10157 58 7.05 10,378 Europe 
Lebanon 346 3 7.17 2,432 Asia United States 27048 163 6.37 14,386 N. America 





Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis. 
Panel A presents summary statistics for the global and regional SRISK for the period from June 2000 to December 2016. It shows the average, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness, kurtosis, and five quantiles of SRISK. It also presents the number of observations (N) in our sample. The countries and the regions are described in Table 2. 
To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. SRISK is priced in millions of USD. Panel B presents summary statistics of SRISK for 5 sectors (Banks, 
Capital Markets, Insurances, Diversified Financial Services and and Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts). Panel C presents summary statistics of GEPU index. Panel D presents 
the correlation analysis of the independent variables that we use in our baseline specification. The variables are described in Section 3.3.  
Panel A. SRISK 
Region Mean St. dev. min max skewness kurtosis p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 N 
Global 8248.76 17704.67 10.12 105492.10 3.67 17.59 10.18 408.21 1728.89 6674.39 105492.10 49,532 
North America 11161.72 18224.72 10.12 105492.10 2.88 12.40 13.77 799.96 3890.16 12630.14 99724.83 7,809 
South America 2900.41 6293.29 10.12 34466.54 3.23 13.13 10.61 167.21 573.15 1815.93 30585.04 1,209 
Europe 10406.46 20085.93 10.12 105492.10 3.06 12.77 10.12 405.96 2294.91 9183.90 105492.10 18,547 
Asia 5824.05 15628.67 10.12 105492.10 4.82 27.68 10.12 345.39 1285.17 3684.68 104640.10 20,552 
Africa 1376.40 2507.51 10.12 33071.94 10.23 125.99 24.67 501.14 876.28 1681.74 5569.78 1,122 
Panel B. SRISK – Financial Sectors 
Banks 8786.48 19678.99 10.12 105492.10 3.45 15.03 11.18 384.27 1665.45 5838.39 105492.10 32,083 
Capital markets 12962.45 21864.20 10.12 105492.10 2.55 9.91 10.12 552.91 2638.57 18105.86 105492.10 3,708 
Insurance 6722.00 9554.70 10.12 69903.29 2.29 8.86 18.57 682.05 2629.54 8594.38 43652.90 7,585 
Diversified Financial Services 1737.18 2427.02 10.12 11751.68 2.14 7.23 11.56 219.42 784.076 1885.67 10938.80 1,547 
Mortgage REITS 276.16 742.91 10.12 6067.41 6.09 43.08 10.12 22.05 81.74 282.86 5702.38 335 
Panel C. GEPU 
GEPU 111.01 43.13 50.26 277.09 1.20 5.00 52.98 79.19 104.00 134.75 272.53 199 
Panel D. Correlation Analysis 
 GEPU 𝑆𝐷 𝑀𝐾𝑇 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇 𝑉𝐼𝑋 𝐴𝐷𝑆 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑁 CAP 
GEPU 1.00         
𝑆𝐷 0.18 1.00        
𝑀𝐾𝑇 -0.13 -0.19 1.00       
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇 0.40 0.43 -0.44 1.00      
𝑉𝐼𝑋 0.40 0.42 -0.34 0.88 1.00     
𝐴𝐷𝑆 -0.19 -0.36 0.24 -0.58 -0.67 1.00    
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.30 0.39 -0.08 0.65 0.75 -0.73 1.00   
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 0.32 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.27 -0.05 0.26 1.00  




Table 4. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall.  
Panel A of the table reports the results of our baseline Equation: 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 +
𝑀𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡. The variables are described in Section 3.3. In Panel B of the table, we include in the baseline specification the financial and macro uncertainty measures 
(real and financial) of Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015), the Financial Stress Indicator (𝐹𝑆𝐼), and the cross-sectional standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm and calendar month level. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
 Panel A. Baseline specification Panel B. Horse race 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.889*** 0.177*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.172*** 0.170*** 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾  0.826*** 0.824*** 0.828*** 0.821*** 0.821*** 0.821*** 0.821*** 0.820*** 0.820*** 
𝑆𝐷   0.104*** 0.085*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇    -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚    0.013** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.016** 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑    -0.017 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.046 0.048 
𝐴𝐷𝑆    0.018 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.011 0.015 
𝑉𝐼𝑋     -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007** -0.005** -0.006** 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇     0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿      0.044    0.084 
𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿       0.016   -0.022 
𝐹𝑆𝐼        0.002  0.001 
𝐶𝑆𝑉         -0.013** -0.015** 
𝐶𝐴𝑃 0.007 0.041*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
Crises 0.113* 0.076*** 0.053** 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.093*** 0.106*** 0.101*** 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 49,292 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,208 47,208 
R2 (within) 11.43% 73.68% 73.74% 73.96% 74.03% 74.04% 74.03% 74.03% 74.01% 74.02% 
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Table 5. The Out-Of-Sample Predictive Power of Economic Policy Uncertainty. 
The table presents the out-of-sample analysis. We implement the predictive accuracy test of Clark and West (2007) 
to examine whether the policy uncertainty improves the forecasting power of the following benchmark models: 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 (column 1), 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  (column 2) and 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡  (column 3). The variables are described in 





𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈), where 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the prediction error of firm 𝑖 at month 𝑡 of the benchmark model, and 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈is the 
prediction error of the model that includes the GEPU index. We obtain the statistic by regressing the quantity 
2𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡(𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈) on a constant with clustered standard errors at firm and calendar month level. To 
mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. The out-of-sample study starts on 
2010M06 and we use a recursive sample. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝑃𝐸̅̅ ̅̅  0.414 0.037 0. 054 
𝑃𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.246 0.010 0. 008 





Table 6. Policy Uncertainty and the Components of SRISK. 
The table reports the effect of policy uncertainty on leverage and systemic risk, which are the two components of 
SRISK. 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃1 is the natural logarithm of k(𝐿𝑉𝐺i,t ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡), 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃2 is the negative of the natural 
logarithm of (1 − k) ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝑒
(𝑙𝑛(1−𝑑)∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡), 𝐿𝑉𝐺i,t is the quasi-leverage ratio defined as: 
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡
, k is the prudential capital ratio which is equal to 5.5% for 
European firms and 8% for non-European ones, 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the beta coefficient with respect to the MSCI World 
Index, which is estimated by using a Dynamic Conditional Beta model (Engle, 2002, 2009), and 𝑑 is a threshold of 
a six month market decline (or systemic crisis event) and its default value is set to -40%. The other variables are 
described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at firm and calendar month level. To mitigate the effect of 
outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. The data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
 Leverage Component Systemic Risk Component 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.010** 0.037*** 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃1 0.959***  
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃2  0.713*** 
𝑆𝐷 -0.015** 0.108*** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇 0.001** -0.005*** 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 0.002** 0.000 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.010*** -0.023 
𝐴𝐷𝑆 0.009*** -0.019* 
𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.001 -0.001 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇 0.000 0.000 
𝐶𝐴𝑃 0.016*** -0.240*** 
Crises 0.019*** -0.002 
Firm fixed effects yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes yes 
Obs. 47,306 47,306 





Table 7. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall: Profitability or Investment?  
The table explores whether the impact of economic policy uncertainty to capital shortfall is driven by changes in 
profitability and investment. We re-estimate Equation 2 (Panel A) by adding two interaction terms. The first, is 
the (lagged) interaction term between the economic uncertainty measure, either the global (𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈, column 1) or 
the country-specific (𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈, column 2), and the equity to assets (𝐸𝑇𝐴) measured at the company level, as a 
proxy for investment. The second, is the (lagged) interaction term between economic uncertainty and the 
profitability (ROE) of the firms in our sample, as a proxy for profitability. Panel B reports the (average) marginal 
effects of ETA and ROE to SRISK. The other variables are described in Section 3.3 and are calculated as averages 
within a quarter. To control for the size of a firm we include the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets 
(𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆). Standard errors are clustered at firm and calendar quarter level. To mitigate the effect of 
outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. The data are quarterly and the sample period is from 2000Q3 to 2016Q4. 
 
Panel A. Baseline specification  
 (1) (2) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.180***  
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝑅𝑂𝐸 -0.001***  
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝐸𝑇𝐴 -0.006***  
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈  0.099*** 
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝑅𝑂𝐸  -0.001*** 
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝐸𝑇𝐴  -0.004** 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 0.592*** 0.601*** 
𝑆𝐷 0.120*** 0.088*** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇 -0.014 -0.017** 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 0.036* 0.036* 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 -0.022 0.072 
𝐴𝐷𝑆 0.029 0.073 
𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.007 -0.006 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇  0.008 0.007 
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 0.496*** 0.524*** 
Crises 0.166** 0.176*** 
Firm fixed effects yes yes 
Quarterly Dummies yes yes 
Obs. 9,389 6,655 
R2 (within) 64.22% 65.73% 
Panel B. Marginal Effects 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 -0.004*** -0.005*** 




Table 8. Instrumental Variable Analysis and Placebo Tests. 
The table presents the results from the two-stage instrumental variable approach (Panels A, B, and C) and from the 
placebo test (Panel D). We use the Migration Fear Index (Panel A), and the Partisan Conflict Index (Panel B) as 
instrumental variables for the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index. In Panel C, we exclude the US companies 
from our dataset and repeat the analysis by using the Partisan Conflict Index. Standard errors are 500 bootstrapped 
and clustered at firm level. Panel D presents the average coefficient estimates from the regression of 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 on 
randomly selected values of 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈. We construct the 𝐺𝐸𝑃?̃? by randomly selecting values without replacement 
from the original series of GEPU. Then, we estimate regression coefficients by using 100 different samples from 
the random 𝐺𝐸𝑃?̃?. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are described in Section 3.3. Coefficients for the control variables are omitted due 
to space limitations. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data 
are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12.  
Panel A. Instrumental variable analysis. The Migration Fear Index 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 
𝐺𝐸𝑃?̂?  0.167*** 
𝑀𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅 0.136**  
Controls yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  yes 
R-squared 51.00% 73.85% 
Panel B. Instrumental variable analysis. The Partisan Conflict Index 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 
𝐺𝐸𝑃?̂?  0.164*** 
𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 0.787***  
Controls yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  yes 
R-squared 62.20% 73.89% 
Panel C. Instrumental variable analysis. The Partisan Conflict Index (excluding the US firms) 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 
𝐺𝐸𝑃?̂?  0.170*** 
𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 0.752***  
Controls yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  yes 
R-squared 63.61% 74.81% 
Panel D. Placebo tests 
 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾  
𝐺𝐸𝑃?̃? -0.002  
Controls yes  





Table 9. Exogenous Shocks  
In Panel A we use as exogenous shocks the natural logarithm of 1 plus i) the number of general strikes in a sample 
country in a given year, taking values from 1 to 13, and zero otherwise; ii) the number of purges in a sample country 
in a given year, taking values from 1 to 4, and zero otherwise; and iii) the number of riots in a sample country in a 
given year, taking values from 1 to 28, and zero otherwise. In Panel B we use as exogenous shocks the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus i) government crises, which take the value from 1 to 4, and zero otherwise; ii) number of major 
cabinet changes in a sample country in a given year, taking values from 1 to 3, and zero otherwise; and iii) number 
of changes in effective executive, taking values from 1 to 3 and zero otherwise. The exogenous shock variables are 
obtained from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (C.N.T.S.). The other variables are described in 
Section 3.3. Standard errors are 500 bootstrapped and clustered at firm level. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we 
winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. The data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
Panel A. GEPU 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.161*** 0.174*** 0.153*** 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐾𝐸𝑆 0.010***   
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑆  0.017***  
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑆   0.006*** 
Controls yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes 
Seasonal (quarterly) dummies yes yes yes 
Obs. 44,930 44,930 44,930 
R2 (within) 74.33% 74.26% 74.30% 
Panel B. LEPU 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.091*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑆 0.008***   
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑆  0.004**  
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑥𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑆   0.004* 
Controls yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes 
Seasonal (quarterly) dummies yes yes yes 
Obs. 31,901 25,021 25,021 







Table 10. Policy Uncertainty and the Capital Shortage: Sensitivity Analysis. 
Panel A1 examines whether there are significant differences between regions (North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa). 
Panel A2 examines whether there are significant differences between industries (Banks, Capital Markets, Insurances, Diversified Financial 
Services and Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts). Panel B1 reports the results of our baseline Equation for four market decline 
thresholds (40%, 30%, 20%, and 10%). The first (fourth) column presents the results for the 40% (10%) market decline threshold. Panel 
B2 of the table reports the results of the Z-test of the equality of coefficients between different market decline thresholds: -40% vs -30%, 
-40% vs -20%, -40% vs -10%, -30% vs -20%, -30 vs -10% and -20% vs -10%. Standard errors are clustered at firm and calendar month 
level. Panel C reports the quantile regression results of our baseline Equation and each column presents the results for a q∈ [0.10, 0.90] 
quantile. The other variables are described in Section 3.3. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are monthly and the sample period is from 
2000M06 to 2016M12. 
Panel A. Regional and Industry Analysis 
Panel A1. Regions Panel A2. Industries 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.211*** 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.178*** 
𝐷𝑆𝐴 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.025 𝐷𝐶𝑀 ×  𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.022 
𝐷𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.060* 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑆 ×  𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.003 
𝐷𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐴 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.026 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝑆 ×  𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.028 
𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐴 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.041 𝐷𝑅𝐸 ×  𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.187*** 
Controls yes Controls yes 
Firm fixed effects yes Firm fixed effects yes 
Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes 
Obs. 47,306 Obs. 47,306 
R2 (within) 74.05% R2 (within) 74.05% 
Panel B. Alternative Market Decline Thresholds 
Panel B1. The Effect of Market Decline Threshold Panel B2. Testing the equality of coefficients 
across columns (Z-test)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.176*** 0.167*** 0.157*** 0.168*** Column (1) vs Column (2) 0.26 
Controls yes yes yes yes Column (1) vs Column (3) 0.51 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes Column (1) vs Column (4) 0.20 
Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes yes yes yes Column (2) vs Column (3) 0.27 
Obs. 47,306 41,984 37,085 32,856 Column (2) vs Column (4) -0.03 
R2 (within) 74.05% 74.26% 74.59% 73.48% Column (3) vs Column (4) -0.27 
Panel C. Capital Shortfall Severance and GEPU 
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.220*** 0.151*** 0.128*** 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.075*** 0.050*** 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 





Table 11. Capital Surplus and Policy Uncertainty: Global, Regional, and Industry Analysis. 
We use the absolute value of SRISK of the well-capitalized firms as dependent variable, since SRISK is negative 
for these firms. Panel A reports the results of our baseline equation. Panel B examines whether there are significant 
differences between regions (North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa) by using interaction terms. 
Panel C examines whether there are significant differences between industries (Banks, Capital Markets, Insurances, 
Diversified Financial Services and Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts) by using interaction terms. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm and calendar month level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial 
correlation in 𝑖,𝑡. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are monthly and the sample period is 
from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
Panel A. Global Panel B. Regions Panel C. Industries 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.094*** 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.106*** 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 -0.118*** 




0.007 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑆 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.052*** 
  𝐷𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐴 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.018 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝑆 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.028 
  𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐴 × 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.014 𝐷𝑅𝐸 ×  GEPU 0.043*** 
Controls yes Controls yes Controls yes 










Obs. 120,309 Obs. 120,309 Obs. 120,309 




Online Appendix. Additional Robustness Tests 
 
Table A1. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall. Last value of daily 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾. 
The table reports the results of our baseline equation, where 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 is the natural logarithm of SRISK defined in Equation (1) by using the last monthly value. The other 
variables are described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at firm and calendar month level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial correlation 
in 𝑖,𝑡.To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.872*** 0.201*** 0.161*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.232*** 0.201*** 0.173*** 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾  0.765*** 0.817*** 0.767*** 0.764*** 0.766*** 0.765*** 0.762*** 0.765*** 0.809*** 
𝑆𝐷   -0.007       -0.027 
𝑀𝐾𝑇    -0.004**      -0.005**  
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚     0.014*     0.025*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑      -0.020    0.052 
𝐴𝐷𝑆       0.005   -0.001 
𝑉𝐼𝑋        -0.003**  -0.010*** 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇         0.000 0.006**  
𝐶𝐴𝑃  0.063*** 0.048*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.030*** 
Crises 0.111** 0.074*** 0.064** 0.063** 0.074** 0.094** 0.083** 0.115*** 0.074** 0.089**  
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 50,391 47,738 46,388 47,738 47,738 47,738 47,738 47,738 47,738 46,388 





Table A2. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall. The First Difference Model. 
The table reports the results of our baseline Equation estimated in first differences. The variables are described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at firm and 
calendar month level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial correlation in 𝑖,𝑡. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% 
and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 
2016M12. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.152*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.058*** 0.103*** 0.097*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.054*** 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾  -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** 
𝑆𝐷   -0.009       -0.015*  
𝑀𝐾𝑇    -0.006***      -0.006*** 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚     0.002     0.005**  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑      -0.020***    -0.014*  
𝐴𝐷𝑆       0.006   0.006 
𝑉𝐼𝑋        0.000  0.000 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇         0.001** 0.000 
𝐶𝐴𝑃  -0.354*** -0.357*** -0.282*** -0.354*** -0.358*** -0.357*** -0.352*** -0.345*** -0.288*** 
Crises 0.065*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.041*** 0.061*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.055*** 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 47,208 45,591 45,591 45,591 45,591 45,591 45,591 45,591 45,591 45,591 





Table A3. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall. The Contemporaneous Model. 
The table reports the results of our baseline Equation: 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑀𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 . The 
variables are described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at firm and calendar month level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial correlation 
in 𝑖,𝑡. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.857*** 0.199*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.197*** 0.203*** 0.208*** 0.199*** 0.185*** 0.189*** 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾  0.824*** 0.821*** 0.827*** 0.823*** 0.824*** 0.823*** 0.824*** 0.825*** 0.818*** 
𝑆𝐷   0.173***       0.172*** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇    -0.005***      -0.006*** 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚     0.006     0.010 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑      -0.013    0.044 
𝐴𝐷𝑆       0.024**   0.043**  
𝑉𝐼𝑋        0.000  -0.003 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇         0.001 0.000 
𝐶𝐴𝑃  -0.010 0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.016 -0.010 -0.007 0.000 
Crises 0.115* 0.077*** 0.039 0.067*** 0.076*** 0.090*** 0.120*** 0.077** 0.060** 0.101*** 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 49,531 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 





Table A4. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall. Normalization with Market Capitalization.   
The table reports the results of our baseline Equation: 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡
CAP𝑖,𝑡 
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
CAP𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑀𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡. The variables are 
described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at firm and calendar month level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial correlation in 𝑖,𝑡. 
To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 1.445*** 0.106*** 0.080*** 0.065* 0.108** 0.131*** 0.101** 0.109** 0.086* 0.091**  
  0.973*** 0.972*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.972*** 
𝑆𝐷   0.180       0.174 
𝑀𝐾𝑇    -0.016***      -0.017*** 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚     -0.005     0.007 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑      -0.060    -0.019 
𝐴𝐷𝑆       -0.012   -0.018 
𝑉𝐼𝑋        0.000  -0.004 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇         0.002 -0.002 
Crises -0.272 0.039 -0.002 -0.003 0.039 0.099*** 0.017 0.043 0.016 0.017 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 49,426 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 47,306 
R2 (within) 0.54% 93.62% 93.62% 93.63% 93.62% 93.62% 93.62% 93.62% 93.62% 93.63% 
61 
 
Table A5. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall: Quarterly Regressions. 
The table reports the results of the baseline specification in quarterly frequency employing total assets in lieu 
of market capitalization to control for firm size. Variables are described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm and calendar quarter level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial 
correlation in residual terms. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are quarterly and the 
sample period is from 2000Q3 to 2016Q4. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.517*** 0.166*** 0.152*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾  0.625*** 0.617*** 0.620*** 0.622*** 
𝑆𝐷   0.105*** 0.108** 0.102** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇    -0.014** -0.011 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚    0.036** 0.039** 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑    -0.064 -0.083 
𝐴𝐷𝑆    -0.006 -0.014 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇     -0.005 
𝑉𝐼𝑋     0.007 
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 1.131*** 0.436*** 0.455*** 0.454*** 0.444*** 
Crises 0.092 0.172*** 0.149** 0.148** 0.152** 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Seasonal (quarterly) 
dummies  
yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 16,029 14,977 14,977 14,977 14,977 
R2 (within) 36.06% 64.56% 64.66% 65.06% 65.07% 
 
 
Table A6. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall: Randomly Reduced Sample. 
The table reports the results of the baseline specification in a randomly reduced sample. Firms are randomly 
selected and for these firms we drop the data from a randomly selected month – different for each one of them 
– from that month till the end of the time period examined. Variables are described in Section 3.3. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm and calendar quarter level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial 
correlation in residual terms. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are monthly and the 
sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12.  
 Baseline specification Horse race 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.178*** 0.172*** 
SRISK 0.821*** 0.820*** 
𝑆𝐷 0.107*** 0.108*** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇 -0.009*** -0.009*** 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 0.020*** 0.016** 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.038 0.046 
𝐴𝐷𝑆 0.017 0.015 
𝑉𝐼𝑋 0.001 0.001 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇 -0.006*** -0.006** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿  0.094 
𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿  -0.033 
𝐹𝑆𝐼  0.001 
𝐶𝑆𝑉  -0.015** 
CAP 0.041*** 0.039*** 
Crises 0.091*** 0.093*** 
Firm fixed effects yes yes 
Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes yes 
Obs. 38,772 38,675 




Table A7. Country-specific Effect of Economic Policy Uncertainty to Capital Shortfall. 
The table presents the results of our baseline equation by using the country-specific Economic Policy 
Uncertainty Indices, LEPU, of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Hong 
Kong, Mexico, India, Ireland, Japan, S. Korea, Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, U.K., U.S, instead of 
the Global Economic Policy Index. Controls are defined in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
and calendar month level to take into account the potential cross-sectional and serial correlation in 𝑖,𝑡. To 
mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are monthly and the sample period is from 
2000M06 to 2016M12. 
𝐿𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.092*** 
Controls yes 
Firm fixed effects yes 
Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes 
Obs. 33,812 
R2 (within) 75.34% 
 
Table A8. Policy Uncertainty and Capital Shortfall. The Effect of the Most Influential Countries.  
Panel A presents the results of our baseline equation by estimating a weighted panel regression that uses as a 
weight the inverse number of observations from each country. Panel B examines whether there are significant 
differences between the effect of GEPU on influential countries (US, UK, Japan) and all the other countries. 
We estimate the baseline equation with the interaction term 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹 for firms in US, UK and Japan. Controls are 
described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at firm and calendar month level to take into account the 
potential cross-sectional and serial correlation in 𝑖,𝑡. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK 
at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
data are monthly and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
Panel A. Weighted Panel B. Difference of Influential Countries 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.163*** 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.175*** 
  𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹 ×  GEPU 0.012 
Controls yes Controls yes 
Firm fixed effects yes Firm fixed effects yes 
Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes Seasonal (monthly) dummies yes 
Obs. 45,815 Obs. 47,306 
R2 (within) 71.25% R2 (within) 74.05% 
 
Table A9. Removing the Effect of Market Conditions from GEPU. 
The table presents the results from a two-stage regression in order to remove the effect of market conditions 
from Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. In the first stage we run the following time-series regression: 
𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + ?̇?, where 𝑋 represents the market condition variable: (a) the Financial 
Stress Indicator, Panel A, (b) Real Uncertainty Index of Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015), Panel B, and (c) 
Financial Uncertainty Index of Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015), Panel C. In the second stage, we estimate our 
baseline equation by substituting 𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑈 with the residual from the first stage ̇. Standard errors are 500 
bootstrapped and clustered at firm level. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorized SRISK at the 1% and 
99%. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The data are monthly 
and the sample period is from 2000M06 to 2016M12. 
Panel A. Financial Stress Indicator Panel B. Real Uncertainty Index 
Panel C. Financial Uncertainty 
Index 
First Stage Beta (𝛽) 0.048*** First Stage Beta (𝛽) 0.713 First Stage Beta (𝛽) 0.786*** 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.174*** 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.154*** 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈 0.156*** 
Controls yes Controls yes Controls yes 










Obs. 47,306 Obs. 47,306 Obs. 47,306 
R2 (within) 74.01% R2 (within) 73.99% R2 (within) 73.99% 
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